RIESENBERG IN PRINTER PROOF

12/5/2010 11:12:12 PM

Notes
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ABSTRACT
In investor-state arbitration, tribunals can and should apply the
English rule on legal costs and abandon the two alternatives, the
American rule and the pro-claimant rule. Under the English rule, the
unsuccessful party in a dispute must indemnify the prevailing party
for the costs of dispute resolution. Both doctrine and public policy
support the application of the English rule, particularly in light of the
much-publicized backlash against the investor-state arbitration
system. Most importantly, the English rule would help to mitigate the
two most commonly identified causes of the backlash—the system’s
alleged proinvestor bias and its chilling effect on host states’ legitimate
use of police power. Though a slowly growing number of tribunals
have either followed or purported to follow the English rule, the
doctrine and policies that justify applying it have so far been either
poorly articulated or ignored. This Note presents those justifications
in detail for the first time.
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INTRODUCTION
This Note addresses the treatment of legal costs in investor-state
1
2
arbitration. Amid the chaos of praise, scorn, and proposals for
redesigning the investor-state arbitration system’s most fundamental
3
mechanics, the question of how lawyers and arbitrators are paid may
seem peripheral. But the treatment of legal costs plays an important
role in the investor-state arbitration system. Certainly, the sums of
4
money paid out in legal cost awards are vast. More importantly, as
Judge Richard Posner and many other writers have observed, the
allocation of legal costs in any dispute-settlement system influences
the character of that system, including the types of claims brought, the
claimants who bring them, and the manner in which they are
5
resolved. If the investor-state arbitration system needs reworking or

1. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, Judge, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, Remarks at Suffolk University Law School (Oct. 31, 2008), in 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263 (2009) (praising the benefits of investor-state arbitration for both
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries).
2. See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (cataloguing the criticisms of investor-state
arbitration, including institutional biases, the “legitimacy deficit,” and inconsistent
jurisprudence); M. Sornarajah, The Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 273 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford
eds., 2009) (arguing that overreaching by “neo-liberals” has led to dissatisfaction with investorstate arbitration and the slowing down of treatymaking).
3. See generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW (2007) (arguing that only the security of tenure can adequately ensure that judges properly
apply international investment law and proposing the creation of an international investment
court); Patrick Juillard, The Law of International Investment: Can the Imbalance Be Redressed?,
in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY: 2008-2009, at 273 (Karl P.
Sauvant ed., 2009) (proposing that the “entire development of international investment law
should at some point come under reappraisal”); Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and
Investor Protection, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 429 (2004) (proposing a “counterclaim
mechanism” under which nationals of host countries could bring claims under investment
treaties against foreign investors for violations of traditional human rights).
4. See, e.g., EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 329
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57 (ordering the claimant to pay $6 million of
Romania’s legal costs); PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05,
Award, ¶ 353 (Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212 (ordering Turkey to pay
almost $14 million in legal costs); Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶ 374 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008) (ordering
the Slovak Republic to pay $10 million of the claimant’s legal costs).
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 70–73
(1996); Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427, 444–
45 (1995); J. Robert S. Prichard, A Systemic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect of Cost,
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fine-tuning, its rule on legal costs is a promising instrument of reform.
Indeed, among the growing literature on redesigning the investorstate arbitration system, there have already been two prominent
6
proposals directed at rethinking the system’s treatment of legal costs.
Dean John Gotanda has proposed a more careful and consistent
7
application of the American rule, whereas Professor Stephan Schill
8
has argued that a pro-claimant rule would be more appropriate. As
does this Note, both of those proposals draw extensively from the
9
numerous studies of legal costs written in the United States in
10
response to the late twentieth-century “litigation boom.”
Unlike Gotanda and Schill, however, this Note argues for the
application of the English rule. Under the English rule, the
unsuccessful party in a dispute must indemnify the prevailing party
for its legal costs. Though investor-state tribunals seem to apply
either the American rule or a de facto version of the pro-claimant
rule in the majority of cases, tribunals have unambiguously followed
the English rule in several decisions and have at least appeared to do

Fee, and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 451,
463–64 (1988).
6. Stephan W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance: Cost-Shifting in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 653 (2006); John Y.
Gotanda, Attorneys’ Fees Agonistes: The Implications of Inconsistency in the Awarding of Fees
and Costs in International Arbitrations 2 (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491755.
7. Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17–19. Under the American rule, both parties pay their own
legal costs regardless of which party prevails on the merits. See infra Part II.A.
8. Schill, supra note 6, at 690. Under the pro-claimant rule, the respondent pays its own
legal costs regardless of which party prevails on the merits. A claimant may recover its legal
costs, however, if it prevails on the merits. See infra Part II.B.
9. Both Schill, supra note 6, and Gotanda, supra note 6, draw extensively from the studies
of legal costs produced in the United States in response to the late twentieth-century “litigation
boom.” The way in which the increased frequency of American litigation and the increased
frequency of investor-state arbitration are invariably described in the academic literature—as a
“litigation boom” and an “explosion of claims”—suggests a parallel between the two
phenomena. Reference to the 1998 “explosion of claims” in investor-state arbitration is very
frequent. See, e.g., M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 309
(2010) (“[W]ith the explosion of claims against states, states began to explore fresh avenues of
defending the claims.”); Nigel Blackaby & Lluís Paradell, Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 1
BERNSTEIN’S HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE 10-001,
-006 (John Tackaberry & Arthur Marriott eds., 4th ed. 2003) (“[T]he explosion of [investorstate] arbitration is a recent phenomenon.”); Jonathan C. Hamilton, A Decade of Latin
American Investment Arbitration, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:
THE CONTROVERSIES AND CONFLICTS 69, 71 (Mary H. Moura & Thomas E. Carbonneau eds.,
2008) (referring to “an explosion in Latin American investment arbitration”).
10. Paul Reidinger, The Litigation Boom, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1987, at 37.
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11

so in many more. Unfortunately, these tribunals have failed to
articulate adequately their reasons for applying the English rule. This
lack of explanation is curious given the strong doctrinal and public
policy justifications for the English rule’s application, particularly in
light of the backlash that currently threatens the investor-state
arbitration system—a backlash manifested in the form of states’
withdrawals from investment treaties, refusals to honor awards, and
12
the reemergence of the “toothless” investment treaty.
Indeed, application of the English rule would help investor-state
tribunals mitigate the two most commonly cited causes of this
troubling backlash: the system’s alleged proinvestor bias and its
13
chilling effect on host states’ legitimate use of police power. Much
like the tribunals themselves, the academic literature has so far failed
to identify this connection. This Note clarifies both the doctrinal and
public policy justifications for the English rule’s application. Parts I
and II provide the necessary background. Part I describes the
mechanics of investor-state arbitration and details the system’s short
history, including the explosion of claims since 1998, the muchpublicized backlash since 2007, and the allegations of bias and
regulatory chill. Part II then describes the inconsistent and
unpredictable treatment of legal costs in investor-state arbitration.
Thereafter, Parts III and IV explain the arguments in favor of the
English rule. Part III addresses doctrine. When advocating for the
application of the American rule or the pro-claimant rule, writers and
14
tribunals primarily emphasize case law —although both concede that
this approach is inadequate. Because the investor-state arbitration
system lacks a formal rule of stare decisis, case law is not binding
15
upon tribunals in subsequent cases. Therefore, Part III looks beyond
case law and addresses all of the sources of substantive and
procedural law applicable in the investor-state arbitration system: the

11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See infra Part I.B.2.
13. See infra Parts III–IV.
14. This is consistent with legal reasoning in investor-state arbitration generally. See Ole
Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals: An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 301, 356–59 (2008) (reviewing almost one hundred investor-state arbitral awards and
demonstrating empirically that investor-state tribunals rely on “precedent” in roughly 90
percent of decisions, more than any other means of determining the law).
15. August Reinisch, The Role of Precedent in ICSID Arbitration, 2008 AUSTRIAN ARB.
Y.B. 495, 501.
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16

host state’s domestic law, “general principles of law as recognized by
17
civilized nations,” and the texts of investment treaties and other ex
18
ante agreements. Though these sources do not necessarily require
tribunals to apply the English rule, they provide substantial support
for its application.
Finally, Part IV presents public policy justifications for applying
the English rule. Considerations of public policy frequently play a
19
role in the decisionmaking of investor-state tribunals. Academic
commentaries—including proposals encouraging tribunals to apply
the American rule or the pro-claimant rule—often have the same
20
emphasis. After reexamining the financial incentives that these two
rules create, however, this Note demonstrates that both the American
rule and the pro-claimant rule exacerbate the most commonly
identified causes of the backlash against investor-state arbitration.
Therefore, because the continued application of the American rule or
the pro-claimant rule would be harmful to the ongoing viability of
investor-state arbitration, tribunals should use their discretion to
apply the English rule.
I. THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: BACKGROUND
AND BACKLASH
The investor-state arbitration system is a network of
approximately three thousand bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties that first emerged in 1957 and proliferated rapidly from 1980
21
to 2001. To Americans, the most famous of these investment treaties
is probably the North American Free Trade Agreement
22
(NAFTA) —though NAFTA is better known in the context of the
free trade debate. In addition to creating a broad framework for

16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See Fauchald, supra note 14, at 356 (demonstrating empirically that investor-state
tribunals rely on public policy or “reasonable results” in just under 40 percent of decisions).
20. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 6, at 690–91 (arguing that the pro-claimant rule would
incentivize compliance with international investment law); Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17–18
(arguing that the consistent application of the American rule would improve predictability).
21. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2006: FDI from
Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 28 fig.I.14, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (2006).
22. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
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multilateral trade liberalization, Chapter 11 of NAFTA includes the
23
two standard obligations of any ordinary investment treaty. The first
of these is substantive, whereas the second is procedural. By acceding
to a multilateral or bilateral investment treaty, the signatory states
undertake, first, to provide foreign investors with substantive rights
24
and protections and, second, to give ex ante consent to binding
arbitration of any disputes based on the state’s future violations of
25
investors’ rights and protections.
A. The Structure and Mechanics of Investor-State Arbitration
1. Substantive Rights and Protections. Most investment treaties
contain a standard set of substantive protections for foreign investors,
including protection from expropriation, protection from
discriminatory treatment, and a guarantee of fair and equitable
26
treatment. American writers have frequently compared these treaty
protections to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ restraints on
government action: protection from expropriation resembles the
27
Takings Clause, protection from discriminatory treatment resembles
28
the Equal Protection Clause, and guarantees of fair and equitable
29
treatment resemble elements of the Due Process Clause. These
23. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (2003) (“In 1994 the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force, bringing with it an adjudicatory
regime that gives investors the right to require arbitration of disputes arising out of investments
in another member country in connection with matters such as expropriation, discrimination,
and unfair treatment.” (footnote omitted)).
24. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 263.
25. Id. at 267.
26. See, e.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 767 (2000) (describing the “regime of investment rules” at the heart
of the new “constitutional” order).
27. See, e.g., Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings”
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 59–86 (2003) (examining the relationship between the NAFTA
tribunals’ decisions on expropriation claims and U.S. domestic law on “regulatory takings”);
Edward J. Sullivan & Kelly D. Connor, Making the Continent Safe for Investors—NAFTA and
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 36 URB. LAW. 99, 100–
02 (2004) (same).
28. See, e.g., Vicki Been, NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Division of Authority for
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 19, 23 (2002) (comparing
“investor protections” to “the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses”).
29. The fair and equitable treatment standard includes a guarantee to provide investors
with due process of law in administrative and judicial proceedings. A second major component
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treaty benefits, however, are not made available to everyone—only to
foreign investors from other treaty states and only in disputes arising
from foreign investment. Neither the host state’s nationals nor the
30
average foreign tourists receive similar assurances.
2. Binding Dispute Resolution. By acceding to an investment
treaty, a state gives ex ante consent to binding arbitration of any
investor’s claim that arises from the state’s breach of the treaty’s
substantive protections. Investors bring their claims against host state
governments before tribunals of neutral arbitrators, selected either by
an appointing authority such as the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or ad hoc by the parties
31
themselves. Unlike most litigation under international law, private
investors can initiate investor-state arbitration without the need for
32
any legal or diplomatic action by their home states’ governments.
33
For example, in PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, an
American power plant developer brought its claim directly against
the Turkish government for negligently failing to disclose key
34
information during the implementation of a power plant project.
The U.S. government did not intervene or have any role in the
dispute. The parties—the power plant developer and the Turkish
government—jointly appointed a tribunal of three arbitrators
pursuant to the ICSID arbitration provisions of a bilateral investment
35
treaty between the United States and Turkey. The tribunal
ultimately found that Turkey’s failure to disclose certain key
information constituted a breach of the fair-and-equitable-treatment

of the standard, unrelated to due process of law, includes the protection of investors’ legitimate
expectations at the time the investment was made, whether created by contractual
arrangements, legislative commitments, or specific assurances. For a summary and analysis of
the jurisprudence in this area, see Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard
in Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAW. 87, 94–106 (2005).
30. See generally Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257 (2010) (describing the
traditionally narrow scope of the terms “investor” and “investment” as applied in international
investment law and presenting arguments for broadening those definitions).
31. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 267.
32. Id.
33. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05, Award (Jan. 19,
2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212.
34. Id. ¶¶ 246–256.
35. Id. ¶ 2.
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36

standard of this investment treaty, and it awarded compensation to
37
the power plant developer. Similarly, in Československá Obchodní
38
Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, a Czech commercial bank won a
claim directly against the Slovak government for its failure to repay a
39
loan. There, too, the Czech government had no role in the
proceeding, which remained the claimant’s to pursue from initiation
to conclusion.
After arbitration has concluded, a successful claimant may
enforce the tribunal’s award against the host states’ assets under one
of two multilateral treaties—the Convention on the Recognition and
40
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)
or the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States (Washington
41
Convention) —in the domestic courts of any nation that is party to
42
those conventions. Enforcement of these arbitration awards is
43
considered “automatic” because courts may only set aside these
awards on very narrow grounds such as fraud, corruption, or ultra
44
vires action on the part of the arbitrator.

36. Id. ¶¶ 246–256.
37. Id. at 90.
38. Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Award (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008).
39. Id. ¶ 223.
40. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
41. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter
Washington Convention].
42. Under the Washington Convention, a state binds its domestic courts to enforce awards
rendered by ICSID-appointed tribunals against respondent states’ assets within its jurisdiction.
Similarly, under the New York Convention, a state binds its domestic courts to enforce nonICSID treaty awards rendered by ad hoc tribunals. The conventions are ratified by over 150
states each. See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN, DON WALLACE, JR., NOAH RUBINS & BORZU
SABAHI, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 675–700 (2008) (describing the investment law
enforcement mechanism).
43. Christoph Schreuer, The World Bank/ICSID Dispute Settlement Procedures, in
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN TAX TREATY LAW 579, 581 (Michael Lang & Mario Züger eds.,
2002) (“The [Washington] Convention offers a system of automatic enforcement that is not
subject to any review of the award at the stage of enforcement.”).
44. Shelby R. Grubbs & Esther R. DeCambra, United States, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE 781, 801 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003).
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B. Historical Background of Investor-State Arbitration
1. 1998 to 2007: Overwhelming Praise. Although these two
complementary obligations unavoidably restrict states’ freedom of
action in dealing with foreign investors, states were for several
decades quite willing to undertake these obligations by ratifying
investment treaties. During the 1990s, as the number of effective
45
investment treaties grew into the thousands, international law
scholars reacted euphorically. They called the investor-state
46
47
arbitration system “a revolution,” a “transformation,” and a “sea
48
49
change.” Its merits were “overwhelming” and its success was
50
“unmitigated.” After twentieth-century experiences with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the emergence of this new and
effective international legal process was a significant change. Since its
founding seventy years ago, the ICJ has decided fewer than 150
51
52
cases and has awarded monetary damages only once —in its very
53
first case. That award was paid in full, but not until fifty-seven years
45. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 21, at 26–29.
46. Joel C. Beauvais, Student Article, Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging
Principles & Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 245, 253 (2002) (describing the
conventional wisdom that “[t]he [bilateral investment treaty] revolution has been accompanied
by . . . an explosion in capital imports to developing countries”).
47. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 LAW &
BUS. REV. AM. 155, 163 (2007) (“The nature and sources of international investment law have
undergone a significant transformation in a relatively short time.”).
48. Ian A. Laird, A Community of Destiny—The Barcelona Traction Case and the
Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA,
BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 94 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005)
(observing that, “[w]ith respect to international investment instruments, there is no doubt that
there has been a sea change away” from previous international law).
49. Schwebel, supra note 1, at 263 (“The merits of bilateral investment treaties are
substantial, indeed, overwhelming.”).
50. Thomas W. Wälde, Improving the Mechanisms for Treaty Negotiation and Investment
Disputes: Competition and Choice as the Path to Quality and Legitimacy, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY, supra note 3, at 505, 506 (calling “the
unexpected, rapid, and extensive development of investment arbitration over the past fifteen
years” an “unmitigated success”).
51. See Advisory Proceedings, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?
p1=3&p2=4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing twenty-six advisory opinions issued since 1947);
Contentious Cases, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 (last
visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing 122 contentious cases decided since 1947).
52. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 244, 250 (Dec. 15) (awarding damages to
the United Kingdom for damage done to one of its vessels from a minefield in Albanian
waters).
53. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 198 (2007).
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54

after the ruling. The ICJ has not awarded damages since. By
contrast, in investor-state arbitration, claims are heard, damages are
awarded, and awards are enforced. Since 1998 investor-state tribunals
55
have decided more than 150 cases, awarding damages in nearly half
56
of them. These awards are paid in full in an estimated 90 percent of
57
cases. At the time of writing, more than 100 new disputes were
58
pending.
2. From 2007 to the Present: Signs of Backlash. Since 2007,
however, the system has suffered a crisis of confidence, suggesting
that states’ interests are not being adequately protected under
international investment law. A small but growing number of national
governments have begun to reject and denounce investor-state
59
arbitration, “voting with their feet and leaving the system.” For
60
example, Bolivia withdrew from the Washington Convention.
61
Ecuador terminated nine of its investment treaties. The Russian
62
Federation withdrew from the multilateral Energy Charter Treaty.
54. Laurence W. Maher, Half Light Between War and Peace: Herbert Vere Evatt, the Rule
of International Law, and the Corfu Channel Case, 9 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL HIST. 47, 80 (2005).
55. List of Concluded Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink; then
follow “Concluded Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2010) (listing 171 cases decided since
1998).
56. See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 49 (2007) (surveying fifty-two investor-state arbitral awards and
finding that investors had won compensation in 38.5 percent of them).
57. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 675 n.1.
58. List of Pending Cases, INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then follow “List of Cases” hyperlink; then
follow “Pending Cases” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). This figure does not include nonICSID treaty claims pending before non-ICSID tribunals.
59. Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin, The Backlash
Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at xxxvii, xlii.
60. Press Release, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Bolivia Submits a Notice
Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank
.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announc
ementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement3 (announcing Bolivia’s
official withdrawal from the Washington Convention).
61. Luke Eric Peterson, Ecuador Will Denounce at Least Nine Bilateral Investment Treaties,
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_feb5_2008.pdf
(describing Ecuador’s withdrawal from at least nine investment treaties “[a]midst growing
discontent amongst South American Governments with the system of international investment
protection”).
62. Francesca Albert & Robert Rothkopf, Russia Rejects Energy Charter Treaty: A New
Era for Investment Arbitration?, INT’L L. OFFICE (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www.internationallaw
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63

Argentina refuses to honor certain categories of arbitral awards.
Moreover, the conclusion of new investment treaties has slowed to a
64
crawl. Even among developed economies such as the United States,
Australia, and Japan, toothless treaties containing the standard
substantive protections but lacking ex ante consent to arbitration
65
have resurfaced.
This apparent backlash against international investment law has
become the subject of tremendous attention and debate. Writers
attempting to identify the causes of the backlash frequently point to
two defects in the investor-state arbitration system: first, the system is
66
allegedly afflicted by a proinvestor bias; second, the system causes
67
“regulatory chill.” Neither of these criticisms has been simple to
prove or disprove, but both have been pervasive.
The proinvestor bias theory of investor-state arbitration arises
from several different underlying concerns. First, some scholars have
criticized the treaty-negotiation process as “lopsided” because
office.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=17675c7c-c55e-4f1d-81cd-e5610fd3b3d8 (noting “Russia’s
reluctance to provide investment protections on its own territory”).
63. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors
Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM (June 25, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/
LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731 (describing Argentina’s failure to pay awards arising from
the emergency measures it took in response to the 2002 financial crisis).
64. See Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment
Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (observing that the rate of new investment
treaties concluded has dropped off since the explosion of investor-state claims).
65. See, e.g., Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an
Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., art. 107, Sept. 9, 2006, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main.pdf (permitting, but not compelling, signatory states to
consent to arbitration with investors); Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.Austl., art. 11.16, May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/australian-fta/final-text (same).
66. See generally Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2, at 433 (finding that a key
problem is not that persons involved in investment treaty arbitration are biased, but that issues
of structure cast doubt on the system).
67. See, e.g., SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, CHALLENGING CORPORATE
INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK’S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF
CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4 (2007), available at http://www.ipsdc.org/reports/challenging_corporate_investor_rule (“[T]he threat of massive damages awards
can put a ‘chilling effect’ on responsible policy-making.”); AARON COSBEY, HOWARD MANN,
LUKE ERIC PETERSON & KONRAD VON MOLTKE, INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 20 (2004) (“A secondary concern is that regulators who are held liable for their
impacts on investors will not regulate to the extent that they should (the regulatory chill
argument).”).
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“[d]eveloping countries are pressured to give up their interests and
68
concerns in exchange for greater incentives to investors.” Second,
commentators have criticized the substantive treaty rights themselves
as “vague” and “open-ended,” and therefore subject to being
construed in ways that the host states could not possibly have
69
expected at the time they entered into the treaties. Third, and most
troublingly, the president of Bolivia and others have accused the
dispute-settlement process itself of being biased in favor of investors,
alleging that “[g]overnments in Latin America . . . never win the
70
cases” and that the investors “always win.” Empirical studies suggest
71
that this last accusation is unfounded, but the overall perception has,
72
nonetheless, been difficult to shed.
Similarly, the regulatory chill theory is also difficult to prove or
disprove. According to some commentators, the threat of an
investment dispute has rendered traditional governmental protection
of health, safety, and human rights prohibitively expensive. One
writer has argued that investor-state arbitration “has gone from being
a protective shield for defending investors against unfair and
discriminatory treatment to a sword used by those investors to attack
73
legitimate government regulation pursued in the public interest.”
Another reports that “practicing lawyers do admit that they hear
rumours of investors applying informal pressure upon host states—
74
while brandishing an investment treaty as a potential legal stick.”

68. Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect
on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 958 (2007).
69. Id. at 960.
70. Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Towards OAS, Says Latin America Better Off
Without World Bank, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2007, 11:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/huff-wires/20070430/la-gen-venezuela-leftist-alternative/ (quoting Evo Morales, President,
Bolivia).
71. See Franck, supra note 56, at 50 (surveying fifty-two awards and concluding that “[t]he
percentage of ultimate winners does not appear to be meaningfully different for investors and
governments.”).
72. See, e.g., Van Harten, supra note 66, at 433 (“Investment treaty arbitration is
characterized by an apparent bias in favor of claimants and against respondent states.”).
73. Aaron Cosbey, The Road to Hell? Investor Protections in NAFTA’s Chapter 11, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BALANCING RIGHTS AND
REWARDS 150, 151 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2005).
74. Luke Eric Peterson, All Roads Lead Out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute
Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 73, at 123, 139.
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Though little empirical evidence exists to confirm the regulatory chill
75
theory, it is nonetheless a favorite of the system’s critics.
Informed by these criticisms, an extensive literature has emerged
over the last few years addressing how the much-beloved and much76
maligned system can be fixed. Many proposals, such as a global
77
investment court of appeals with a tenured judiciary, seem too
ambitious to be politically feasible at present. Multilateral trade
treaties and the World Trade Organization (WTO) disputesettlement mechanism may provide some hope for the establishment
of global, “top-down” solutions in the future, but attempts at drafting
multilateral treaties have experienced a gloomy “eight decades of
78
failure” in the investment law context. For now, it appears that
effective changes to international investment law can only be brought
about in a piecemeal, case-by-case fashion by the tribunals
themselves.
II. THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF LEGAL COSTS
As Part I explains, the two most commonly identified causes of
the backlash against investor-state arbitration are the system’s alleged
proinvestor bias and its chilling effect on host states’ legitimate use of
police power. As Part IV ultimately shows, the English rule on legal
costs can help to mitigate both of these factors. But before this can be
explained, it is necessary to examine and understand the system’s
inconsistent treatment of legal costs.
Whether domestic or international, dispute settlement systems
allocate “legal costs”—court costs, attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees, and
arbitrators’ fees—according to three distinct practices: the American
rule, the English rule, and the pro-claimant rule. Under the American
79
rule, “the costs lie where they fall.” That is, both the respondent and
claimant pay their own legal costs, regardless of which party is
75. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Juillard, supra note 3, at 168 (proposing that the “entire development of
international law should at some point come under reappraisal”).
77. Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, AM. LAW., Summer 2004,
at 26.
78. See Charles H. Brower, II, Reflections on the Road Ahead: Living with Decentralization
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 2,
at 339, 348 (calling “simple, top-down solutions” unfeasible and drawing on “eight decades of
failure to negotiate comprehensive multilateral treaties on foreign investment” as proof).
79. Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10
(1984).

RIESENBERG IN PRINTER PROOF

990

12/5/2010 11:12:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
80

[Vol. 60:977
81

successful on the merits. There is no shifting of legal costs, except
82
when one of the two parties is penalized for litigating in bad faith.
83
By contrast, under the English rule, “the costs follow the event.”
That is, the party that is unsuccessful on the merits must always
indemnify the prevailing party for part or all of its legal costs, even
84
when both sides litigate in good faith. Finally, under the hybridized
pro-claimant rule, prevailing claimants always recover their legal
costs, as under the English rule, but prevailing respondents must
85
always bear their own legal costs, as under the American rule.
In domestic litigation, the prospect of having to pay one’s own
legal costs or an opponent’s legal costs can have a material effect on
the decision to pursue, contest, or settle a claim. In investor-state
arbitration, the sheer expense of the system likely amplifies this
effect. On average, respondents incur annual legal costs ranging from
86
one to two million dollars for a single dispute, though costs can far
exceed this average. In one case, the claimant and the respondent

80. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18
(1967) (discussing the American rule and the policies underpinning it); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (recognizing the American rule to be “[t]he general practice of the
United States”).
81. The common law exceptions to this general rule, such as the common benefit doctrine,
are applied very rarely. For the U.S. Supreme Court’s description of the common benefit
doctrine, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245–46 (1975).
82. Id. The practice of awarding costs to punish bad-faith litigation has also been
incorporated into Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11
(permitting U.S. federal courts to sanction litigants for pleadings, motions, or other papers that
are “presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” or that are based on frivolous facts or legal theories).
83. MICHAEL ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 573
(10th ed. 2007).
84. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1026–27 (1994).
85. This is not the generally applicable rule in any domestic jurisdiction, but several
jurisdictions—including the United States—apply it in certain exceptional cases. See Harold J.
Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2041 (1993).
86. See Secretariat, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Issues Related to
International Arrangements: Investor-State Disputes and Policy Implications, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/COM.2/62 (Jan. 14, 2005) (noting that the expected legal fees incurred by the Czech
Republic for one case were over $13.8 million in one year).
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each reported incurring more than $14 million in legal costs. In
88
another case, the parties reported a shared total of $21 million.
Regardless of the relative merits of each party’s case, it is
difficult to predict with certainty which party will ultimately bear
these costs. Arbitration rules accord arbitrators broad discretion in
allocating legal costs, and tribunals exercise this discretion
inconsistently. Both tribunals and commentators agree that the
89
practice is “arbitrary and unpredictable.”
A. Application of the American Rule
In 2007, an empirical study showed that investor-state tribunals
had followed the American rule and ordered parties to pay their own
90
legal fees in about four-fifths of disputes. Tribunals have noticed this
general trend, but they have not yet explained the reasons for it.
Respected arbitrator and advocate Arthur Rovine wrote simply in his
91
dissent to EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania that “[e]ach side bearing
92
its own costs has been an ICSID tradition.” Likewise, in his dissent
to International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican
93
States, Professor Thomas Wälde recognized a principle of
“established NAFTA and ICSID jurisprudence” requiring that “each
party, winning or losing, bear its own legal expenses and share the
87. Československá Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Award, ¶ 374 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 181 (2008).
88. PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/05, Award, ¶ 353
(Jan. 19, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC630_En&caseId=C212.
89. Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 159
(Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 192 (2004); DUGAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 614; see also
CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, LORETTA MALINTOPPI, AUGUST REINISCH & ANTHONY SINCLAIR,
THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1229 (2d ed. 2009) (“The practice of ICSID
tribunals in apportioning costs is neither clear nor uniform.”); Steven Smith, Benjamin
Smietana, Grant Gelberg, Ivana Cingel, Kevin Rubino, Spencer Jones, Frederic Sourgens &
Sean Newell, International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L LAW. 363, 393 (2008)
(describing the American rule as the “traditional approach” but noting tribunals’ increasing
tendency to depart from tradition).
90. Franck, supra note 56, at 69.
91. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/13, Award (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&
docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57.
92. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Dissent Regarding Costs,
¶ 4 (Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1216_En&caseId=C57.
93. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf.
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costs of arbitration,” unless arbitrators find “either gross professional
94
misconduct” or “a manifestly spurious claim.”
B. Application of the Pro-Claimant Rule
In an attempt to explain the 20 percent of cases in which the costs
do not simply “lie where they fall,” a second line of analysis suggests
that tribunals do not actually follow the American rule, but rather the
pro-claimant rule—without ever saying so explicitly. Professor Schill
95
makes this argument in a 2006 article. Analyzing what tribunals do,
rather than what they say, Schill asserts that tribunals consistently
award legal costs to prevailing claimants but not to prevailing
respondents, resulting in a “one-way, pro-investor cost-shifting
96
approach.”
Schill acknowledges that a number of cases do not immediately
appear to support his theory, but he argues that these cases are
nevertheless more compatible with a pro-claimant rule than it would
97
first appear. Schill argues that the majority of legal cost awards
requiring unsuccessful claimants to pay prevailing respondents’ legal
costs have not resulted solely from the merits of the case, as would
happen under the English rule. Rather, such awards have been made
with the intention of punishing claimants’ “frivolous and spurious
98
claims or, more generally, bad faith litigation.” Put simply, Schill
proposes that tribunals have actually adopted a de facto pro-claimant
rule and that other commentators have simply misinterpreted a
traditional penalty for bad faith—awarding legal costs—as sporadic
application of the English rule.
Moreover, Schill argues that the de facto pro-claimant rule is a
normatively appropriate rule for the investor-state arbitration system,
99
and that this rule should be made de jure. He envisions the investorstate arbitration system as “a mechanism for the enforcement of

94. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, at 116
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf.
95. Schill, supra note 6, at 657.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also id. at 665 (“Apart from [a] single exception, investment tribunals applying
either ICSID or [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law] arbitration rules
have not clearly endorsed a ‘loser pays’ approach in order to shift costs in favor of the prevailing
government unless the claims brought were spurious or otherwise frivolous.”).
99. See id. at 674.
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100

which is well suited by a legal-costs rule that
obligations,”
contributes “additional deterrence of potential defendants” and
“induces compliance” by incentivizing investors to bring more claims
101
for larger amounts. Schill’s proinvestor proposal was likely very
convincing in 2006, one year before Bolivia withdrew from the
Washington Convention, when the legal regime seemed to be on
102
firmer footing. Today, however, the backlash against investor-state
arbitration provides sufficient reason to rethink Schill’s normative
arguments. Because a uniquely proinvestor procedural advantage
disincentivizes host states from participating in the investment
arbitration regime, the overall aim of investment protection would be
better served by a more balanced approach. After all, investor-state
arbitration cannot protect any foreign investments if states simply
withdraw from the system.
C. Application of the English Rule
Even disregarding cases in which legal cost awards may be used
implicitly as a penalty for bad faith, tribunals do not apply Schill’s
proposed de facto pro-claimant rule universally. Cases such as EDF
and Thunderbird provide unmistakable proof that arbitrators follow
the authentic English rule in some circumstances. In EDF, the
unsuccessful claimant—who failed to show that the Romanian
government had taken the claimant’s profitable duty-free business
and other commercial properties on an arbitrary and discriminatory
basis—was ordered to indemnify Romania for $6 million of its legal
103
costs. In Thunderbird, the unsuccessful claimant—who failed to
show that the Mexican government had closed the claimant’s gaming
facilities for unfair and inequitable reasons—was ordered to
104
indemnify Mexico for $1.1 million. In both of these cases, the
tribunals explicitly found that there had been no bad faith or

100. Id. at 679.
101. Id. at 690–92.
102. See Press Release, Int’l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, supra note 60 (noting
Bolivia’s “denunciation of the ICSID Convention”).
103. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 329 (Oct. 8,
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57.
104. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 220
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward
.pdf.
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misconduct by the claimants during arbitration. Nevertheless, both
tribunals awarded legal costs to the respondents based on the merits
of the dispute. In doing so, both tribunals observed that it is the
practice in international commercial arbitration to award costs based
106
on the merits of the dispute.
There are also a large number of ambiguous cases, such as LinkTrading Joint Stock Co. v. Department for Customs Control of the
107
108
Republic of Moldova and Methanex Corp. v. United States, in
which legal costs are awarded to respondents but there is no explicit
mention of bad faith. In these cases, however, Schill is convinced by
109
the “general tone” of the decisions that the claimants’ misconduct
110
had a material influence on the result. Nevertheless, the tribunals at
least purported to base their decisions on the respondents’ success on
111
the merits. Moreover, in numerous cases in which tribunals award
costs in favor of prevailing claimants, they generally declare in neutral
terms that “the successful party should receive reimbursement from
112
the unsuccessful party.” If these tribunals realize that they are
applying this rule only to the detriment of the states, they do not say
so explicitly.

105. See EDF, Award, ¶ 328 (“In the Tribunal’s judgment, the instant dispute was fairly
brought by Claimant and good faith was evidenced by each side.”); Int’l Thunderbird, Arbitral
Award, ¶ 218 (“[T]he Parties here presented their case in an efficient and professional
manner.”).
106. See EDF, Award, ¶ 327 (“In the instant case, and generally, the Tribunal’s preferred
approach to costs is that of international commercial arbitration and its growing application to
investment arbitration. That is, there should be an allocation of costs that reflects in some
measure the principle that the losing party pays, but not necessarily all of the costs of the
arbitration or of the prevailing party.”); Int’l Thunderbird, Arbitral Award, ¶ 214 (noting that
“the same rules should apply to international investment arbitration as apply in other
international arbitration proceedings”).
107. Link-Trading Joint Stock Co. v. Dep’t for Customs Control of the Republic of Mold.,
Final Award (U.S.-Mold. Apr. 18, 2002), 13 ICSID Rep. 14 (2008).
108. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and
Merits (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005).
109. Schill, supra note 6, at 659–60.
110. See id. at 659–63 (“[C]ost shifting against the losing investor can be seen as a reaction to
frivolous claims or bad faith litigation.”).
111. Methanex, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, pt. V., ¶ 10; LinkTrading, Final Award, ¶ 93.
112. See, e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award, ¶ 533
(Sept. 27, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf (“In the present
case, the Tribunal can find no reason to depart from the starting point that the successful party
should receive reimbursement from the unsuccessful party.”).
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In EDF and Thunderbird, when the majorities unambiguously
applied the English Rule, they provoked vigorous dissents by
113
114
arbitrators Rovine and Wälde, respectively. Strikingly, both of
them directed their dissents at the respective majorities’ deliberative
methodology, rather than at their final decisions to award legal costs.
Neither dissent defended the American rule or the pro-claimant rule
on the basis of any particular benefits conferred by either rule.
Rather, the dissents observed that following the American rule was
the usual practice in investor-state arbitration and objected to the
115
116
majorities’ “departure” from “ICSID tradition” and “established
117
NAFTA and ICSID jurisprudence” without articulating adequate
reasons for such a departure. Indeed, Rovine acknowledged the
possibility that there may be “good underlying reasons” for applying
the English rule but argued forcefully that the majorities should
either identify and evaluate these hypothetical reasons or else adhere
118
to the standard practice.
III. DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING THE
ENGLISH RULE
This Note follows Rovine and Wälde’s prompting and identifies
the “good underlying reasons” found in doctrine and public policy
that support application of the English rule. From a doctrinal
standpoint, it is not obvious how legal costs should be awarded in
investor-state arbitration, but there are persuasive reasons for
applying the English rule.
Rovine and Wälde’s dissents in EDF and Thunderbird are based
on a presumption that ICSID tradition should control unless
adequate reasons can support departure from it. Even in the absence

113. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Dissent Regarding Costs,
¶ 4 (Oct. 8, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1216_En&caseId=C57.
114. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶ 124
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf.
115. Id. ¶ 126; see also EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 6 (“In light of the determinations
made by the Tribunal . . . there is a question whether there is a sufficient or any reason in this
case to depart from the approach of each side bearing its own costs.” (emphasis added)).
116. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 4.
117. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 124.
118. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶ 12 (“There may well be good underlying reasons for
applying the loser pays doctrine . . . .”).
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of a formal rule of stare decisis, the existence of settled legal doctrine
might demonstrate that previous tribunals have already identified,
evaluated, and reconciled the issues worthy of consideration in
119
resolving a specific type of legal problem.
Economist and
philosopher F.A. Hayek argued that judicial precedent safeguards
“the experience gained by the experimentation of generations,”
120
which “embodies more knowledge than [is] possessed by anyone.”
In Rovine and Wälde’s view, because the EDF and Thunderbird
majorities did not support their decisions with precedent, the
121
decisions were presumptively contrary to established law.
Departure from the American rule, therefore, came with the
methodological burden of providing a rationale for the departure.
Had the majorities simply followed the American rule, there would
have been no such burden and no need for additional justifications.
But it is unfair to give such emphasis to nonbinding precedent,
because investor-state arbitration recognizes other sources of law and
gives them equal or greater doctrinal weight. Under Article 42(1) of
the Washington Convention, tribunals are to apply two sources of law
when the Convention, the investment treaty, and parties’ choice-oflaw agreements leave a question unsettled. First, arbitrators “shall
122
apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute.” Second,
123
arbitrators shall apply “rules of international law.” This second
source, “rules of international law,” is the window through which
investor-state arbitral precedents may affect future disputes. As
Wälde himself observed in Thunderbird, precedent properly applies
in an investor-state dispute only because it is a traditionally
124
recognized subcomponent of public international law.
But precedent is not the only component of international law,
nor is it given the most deference. In fact, both the EDF and
Thunderbird majorities also based their use of the English rule on an
equally valid subcomponent of public international law, “general

119. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 47
(3d ed. 2007) (comparing the use of precedent in civil law and common law systems).
120. 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 119 (1973).
121. EDF, Dissent Regarding Costs, ¶¶ 6, 10; Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶¶ 126,
129.
122. Washington Convention, supra note 41, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. at
186.
123. Id.
124. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129.
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125

principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” The EDF
tribunal, for example, announced that “[i]n the instant case, and
generally, the Tribunal’s preferred approach to costs is that of
international commercial arbitration and its growing application to
126
investment arbitration.” Though the majorities did not make this
doctrinal link explicit, such a statement about international
commercial arbitration can only be interpreted as a reference to a
127
“general principle of law.” That is the only basis on which a
reference to international commercial arbitration, an entirely distinct
form of dispute settlement, could be meaningful in an investor-state
arbitration. Indeed, at least one writer on legal costs has concluded
that commercial arbitral practice is evidence of a “general principle”
128
supporting application of the English rule. “General principles of
law recognized by civilized nations” are also a component of public
international law and are doctrinally granted more weight than
129
precedent.
Therefore, because the majorities identified a suitable doctrinal
basis for their decisions—a general principle of law as evidenced by
international commercial arbitration—Rovine and Wälde were wrong
to insist that the burden rested squarely with the majorities to identify
additional reasons supporting application of the English rule. The
majorities likely could have articulated the link between commercial
arbitration and investor-state arbitration more clearly, if only to
insulate their decisions from dissent. Likewise, the majorities could
have drawn on several other applicable sources of law that would
have unambiguously supported application of the English rule. An
examination of these sources follows.

125. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 90
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward
.pdf.
126. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 327 (Oct. 8,
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57.
127. See infra Part III.C.
128. See John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International
Commercial Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 & n.160 (1999) (“[T]he principle that costs
follow the event is almost universally recognized. Indeed, it is so well-accepted that it may be
viewed as a general principle of international law.” (footnote omitted)).
129. See infra Part III.C.
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A. Ex Ante Agreements Are Generally Silent as to How Legal Costs
Should Be Awarded
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the
sources of investment law specified in Article 42(1) of the
Washington Convention are not all of equal weight. Taking its basic
structure from commercial arbitration, the investor-state arbitration
system gives priority to sources of law chosen by the parties to the
130
dispute.
Therefore, tribunals first look to the Washington
Convention, the investment treaty, and any other choice-of-law rules
selected ex ante by the parties. It is only in the absence of ex ante
agreement that tribunals are obliged to consider the two gap-fillers—
that is, “the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and
131
such rules of international law as may be applicable.”
Unfortunately, ex ante agreements rarely provide guidance on
the distribution of legal costs. The Washington Convention, which
governs the procedure of ICSID-appointed tribunals, gives arbitrators
complete discretion under Article 61(2) to determine how legal costs
should be awarded: “[T]he Tribunal shall, except as the parties
otherwise agree . . . decide how and by whom those expenses . . . shall
132
be paid.” Other sets of commonly selected procedural rules grant
equally broad discretion. For example, though the rules authored by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) hint at a presumption that arbitrators should apply the
English rule to a portion of the costs, arbitrators may apparently
133
reject this presumption for whatever reasons they wish.
130. See ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE
PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 94 (4th
ed. 2004) (“It is generally recognized that parties to an international commercial agreement are
free to choose for themselves the law (or the legal rules) applicable to that agreement.”
(footnote omitted)).
131. Washington Convention, supra note 41, art. 42(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1286, 575 U.N.T.S. at
186.
132. Id. art. 61(2), 17 U.S.T. at 1294, 575 U.N.T.S at 198.
133. Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 43d Sess., June
21–July 9, 2010, annex I, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/65/17; GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. No. 17 (2010),
available at uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-2010e.pdf. Article 42(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules gives tribunals complete discretion with respect to
attorneys’ fees, id. annex I, art. 42(2), although Article 42(1) provides that “[t]he costs of the
arbitration”—meaning administrative costs and arbitrators’ fees—“shall in principle be borne
by the unsuccessful party,” id. annex I, art. 42(1).
The current Article 42 was originally Article 40 when the UNCITRAL rules were first
adopted, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976), but was renumbered when the rules
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Likewise, investment treaties and choice-of-law agreements are
almost invariably silent on legal costs, leaving arbitrators with an
“unfettered and arbitrary” discretion that makes both tribunals and
134
commentators acutely uncomfortable. Professor Schill has pointed
out the irony of this broad discretion, given that any discretionary
exercise of power without a reasoned basis seems somewhat contrary
135
to the spirit of international investment law. After all, investment
law does not permit states to treat foreign investors in an arbitrary
manner. Rather, investor-state tribunals require judicial and
administrative organs of state governments to base all of their
136
decisionmaking on adequate and articulated reasoning, and they
unanimously agree that arbitrary treatment constitutes a breach of
137
investment treaties’ substantive protections. Admitting that their
own decisionmaking with regard to legal costs is arbitrary or
unfettered would place an investor-state tribunal in a position of
hypocrisy.
To dispel the discomfort surrounding their “unfettered and
arbitrary” discretion as to legal costs, tribunals frequently go beyond
the ex ante texts in search of legal principles on which to base their
decisions. This search draws tribunals to examine the law of the
domestic jurisdiction and public international law. Indeed, tribunals

were amended, Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Committee on International Trade
Law as Revised in 2010, G.A. Draft Res., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/65/L.5 (Oct. 26, 2010).
134. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶ 125
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdSeparate
Opinion.pdf (analyzing the tribunal’s discretion under the UNCITRAL rules); Schill, supra note
6, at 658–59 (“The discretion conferred upon arbitral tribunals accounts for a considerable
amount of uncertainty in the allocation of costs in investment treaty arbitration.”).
135. See Schill, supra note 6, at 664–65 (“[T]he assumption of an unfettered discretion that
would allow tribunals to decide the issue of costs without regard to prior practice in investment
treaty arbitration comes close to arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making of administrative
agencies, a practice that can constitute a violation of fair and equitable treatment under
international investment treaties if entertained by domestic administrators.” (footnote
omitted)).
136. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 134 (2004) (emphasizing
the need for consistency in the decisionmaking of a national agency under the guarantee of fair
and equitable treatment).
137. See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, ¶¶ 625–626 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Glamis_Award_001.pdf
(“Previous tribunals have indeed found a certain level of arbitrariness to violate the obligations
of a State under the fair and equitable treatment standard. Indeed, arbitrariness that
contravenes the rule of law, rather than a rule of law, would occasion surprise not only from
investors, but also from tribunals.”).
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may even be obligated to do so. After all, if tribunals’ discretion on
legal costs were actually unfettered, then Rovine and Wälde would
have had no basis for their objections in EDF and Thunderbird.
Despite the confidence with which the dissenters defended the
doctrinal correctness of the American rule, an examination of the
additional sources of applicable law—domestic law and public
international law—reveals substantial authority favoring application
of the English rule.
B. Domestic Law Supports the English Rule in All Disputes in which
the United States Is Not a Party
In nearly every investor-state dispute, application of “the law of
the Contracting State party” supports application of the English rule.
The term “English rule” is a misnomer made in America. Nearly
every domestic legal system in the world, whether belonging to the
138
139
common law or civil law tradition, follows a variation of the rule
that “costs follow the event.” The single obvious exception is the
140
United States, which follows the American rule.
Some jurisdictions codify the English rule in statutes or
141
142
regulations. In others, the English rule is a judge-made practice.
Some jurisdictions follow the Welamson doctrine, which awards legal
costs to the prevailing party based on the proportion of its successful
143
claims to its unsuccessful claims. Despite these variations, in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions worldwide, courts award
reasonable legal costs to the prevailing party. Though several
138. See 1 LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY
REPORT 21–22 (analyzing the rules on costs in the United Kingdom); 2 id. at 545–639 (2009)
(analyzing the rules on costs of other major common law jurisdictions in the world, including
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Scotland, and observing that only the United States
follows the American rule).
139. See MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 1026–27 (observing that all civil law
jurisdictions follow some version of the English rule, though five civil law jurisdictions only
apply the English Rule to the costs that the court or administrative tribunal incurs, rather than
to both the tribunal’s costs and the parties’ attorneys’ costs).
140. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18
(1967) (considering the policies underpinning the American rule); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (recognizing the American rule to be “[t]he general practice of the
United States”).
141. See Gotanda, supra note 128, at 6–7 (citing the legislation of France, Germany, Sweden,
and Brazil).
142. See id. (citing judge-made law in Canada and Australia).
143. J. Gillis Wetter & Charl Priem, Costs and Their Allocation in International Commercial
Arbitrations, 2 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 249, 273–74 (1991).
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144

theoretical justifications for this practice exist, domestic courts most
widely adhere to the rationale that a claimant should be made
financially whole for a legal wrong suffered and should not be
145
satisfied with a lesser amount because of the necessity of suing.
Likewise, one who successfully defends himself against an unjustified
146
claim should come out of the experience without financial loss.
In at least three cases before investor-state tribunals, arbitrators
have looked to a host state’s law either to support a decision on legal
147
148
costs or to dissent from one. This demonstrates that Article 42(1)
of the Washington Convention is not a dead letter rendered irrelevant
by arbitrators’ preference for case law. Therefore, because the United
States is the sole jurisdiction that does not follow the English rule, the
law of “the Contracting State party” should consistently support
applying the English rule whenever the respondent is not the United
States.
C. The English Rule in Public International Law
Though arbitrators have looked to domestic law in certain
decisions about legal costs, they have referred to public international
law in many more. Indeed, as Wälde recognized in Thunderbird,

144. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 (citing six theoretical grounds for the practice).
145. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 65–67 (Winter 1984) (citing Italian, German, and French authorities).
146. Id. at 66–67.
147. See CME Czech Republic B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Final Award on Damages,
¶¶ 648–649 (UNCITRAL Arb. Mar. 14, 2003), 9 ICSID Rep. 264 (2006) (referring to Czech
law); see also Himpurna California Energy Ltd. (Berm.) v. PT. (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik
Negara (Indon.), Final Award, ¶ 390 (UNCITRAL Arb. May 4, 1999), reprinted in 25 Y.B.
COMM. ARB. 13 (2000) (referring to Indonesian law, the host state’s law, and to U.S. law, the
law of the investor’s home state). In Himpurna, the tribunal decided not to award costs in part
because it found that litigants in both the United States and Indonesia “broadly” bear their
attorneys’ fees, even though Indonesia does in fact require unsuccessful parties to pay the costs
that the court or administrative tribunal incurs. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 84, at 1026–27.
148. Professor Wälde’s separate opinion in Thunderbird conducted a comparative analysis
of domestic law across the continent, looking broadly to “practice in North American litigation
and arbitration.” See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate
Opinion, ¶ 124 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
ThunderbirdSeparateOpinion.pdf (“[I]n North American litigation and arbitration . . . . ‘[f]ee
shifting’ is as a rule only allowed in case of misconduct—contempt of court, incompetent or
unacceptable litigation conduct, bad faith in arbitration or frivolous claims.” (footnotes
omitted)). Professor Wälde’s findings do not seem easily reconcilable with Lord Justice
Jackson’s descriptions of Canadian practice, see 2 JACKSON, supra note 138, at 85, or with
Professor Gotanda’s descriptions of Mexican practice, see Gotanda, supra note 128, at 8.
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public international law is the only channel through which precedent
149
may enter a tribunal’s deliberative process under Article 42(1).
The content of public international law is not defined in the
Washington Convention, but it is well understood to consist of the
five components described in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
150
International Court of Justice. A two-tiered hierarchy exists within
these five components. The three sources of public international law
include “international conventions,” “international custom,” and
151
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” The two
subsidiary means of determining international law include “judicial
decisions,” such as the awards rendered by investor-state tribunals,
and “the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists,” a phrase
which refers generally to academic commentary on international
152
law. Doctrinally, when precedent or academic commentary is in
conflict with any of the primary sources of international law, courts
and tribunals should follow the primary sources. In public
international law, precedent and academic commentary “do not
create rules of law, but only serve as means for determining such
153
rules.”
Considering the almost universal acceptance of the English rule
on legal costs in domestic law, Dean Gotanda has proposed that the
rule “constitutes a general principle of international law” recognized
154
by civilized nations. General principles of law may be identified
when the national laws of many domestic systems converge, though
155
unanimous worldwide convergence is not required. In particular,
these principles frequently help international courts settle questions
156
of procedure.

149. Int’l Thunderbird, Separate Opinion, ¶ 129.
150. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031,
1060.
151. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4–5 (1998) (quoting
Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. at 1060).
152. Id. at 19, 24.
153. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 23 (2006).
154. Gotanda, supra note 128, 34 n.160. But see Gotanda, supra note 6, at 17 (citing the
policy rationale of predictability, rather than doctrine, as the basis for adopting the American
rule on legal costs).
155. Emmanuel Gaillard, Use of General Principles of International Law in International
Long-Term Contracts, 27 INT’L BUS. LAW. 214, 216 (1999).
156. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 23 (1998).

RIESENBERG IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

APPLYING THE ENGLISH RULE

12/5/2010 11:12:12 PM

1003

Not all commentators and tribunals agree, however, that
comparative domestic practice is the only factor in identifying a
general principle of law. Some writers insist that examination of
157
comparative international practice is also a necessary step. Sharing
this view, the Thunderbird and EDF tribunals based part of their
respective decisions on a review of the treatment of legal costs in
various forms of international litigation. Both majorities looked to
international commercial arbitration, which in a sense is an
international practice, though it governs private legal relationships
158
rather than public ones. The EDF tribunal also considered what it
ambiguously called “the public international rule,” which, from the
159
context, most likely referred to cases before the ICJ. Professor
Wälde’s dissent in Thunderbird broadly surveyed the practices of the
WTO dispute-settlement body, the European Court of Human Rights
160
(ECHR), and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
As a whole, international litigation presents a more divided and
complicated picture than does domestic law. Although permitted
under its statute to award legal costs to litigating states at its
161
discretion, the ICJ has always followed the American rule—which is
unsurprising given the ICJ’s difficulties with enforcing awards of
162
ordinary monetary damages. The WTO dispute-settlement body
likewise follows the American rule—which is even less surprising
163
By
because the WTO’s remedies are entirely nonmonetary.
contrast, the ECHR and its analogue, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR), both follow the pro-claimant rule to

157. CHENG, supra note 153, at 2–3.
158. EDF (Servs.) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 326 (Oct. 8,
2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=show
Doc&docId=DC1215_En&caseId=C57; Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican
States, Arbitral Award, ¶ 218 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf.
159. EDF, Award, ¶ 322.
160. See Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion, ¶¶
140–141 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Thunderbird
SeparateOpinion.pdf (observing that in the WTO and under the European Convention on
Human Rights, prevailing parties are not awarded costs, whereas in the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal, costs have been awarded in only a fraction of the cases).
161. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150, art. 64, 59 Stat. at 1063
(“Unless otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs.”).
162. BROWN, supra note 53, at 193–94.
163. Id. at 216.
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accommodate claimants who may be “indigent, social outcasts, or
164
marginalized.”
Nevertheless, international legal practice sometimes follows the
English rule. International commercial arbitration, in particular,
follows the English rule, as the Thunderbird and EDF tribunals
165
observed. So does the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in most of its
166
cases. Therefore, though far from unanimous, international legal
practice still provides an adequate doctrinal basis for the application
of the English rule on legal costs.
*

*

*

From a doctrinal standpoint, it is not obvious how legal costs
should be awarded in investor-state arbitration, but there is at least as
much support for the English rule as for either alternative. Though
ICSID case law tends to support either the pro-claimant rule or the
American rule, tribunals have applied or purported to apply the
English rule in many cases. Domestic law almost always supports the
English rule, except when the United States is a party to the dispute.
Domestic litigation provides evidence that the English rule is a
general principle of law, but the practice in international litigation is
more mixed.
Therefore, because doctrine does not settle the question entirely,
tribunals are justified in moving past doctrine to consider public
policy and practical realities.
IV. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR APPLYING THE ENGLISH RULE
Though the legal doctrine presents a somewhat divided picture,
public policy considerations support application of the English rule.
This is particularly true in the post-2007 political environment. Today,
the investor-state arbitration system is regularly accused of both

164. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 368 (2d ed.
2005). But see id. (noting, however, that the IACHR had followed the American rule until
1998).
165. See Gotanda, supra note 128, at 34 n.160 (explaining that most countries award costs
and attorneys’ fees, which suggests that the practice is a “general principle of international
law”).
166. STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 380 (1990) (noting that the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298 (1985), observed that the tribunal could award
costs only if they were reasonable).
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showing a proinvestor bias and of producing a chilling effect on host
167
states’ legitimate use of police power. The pro-claimant rule and the
American rule only exacerbate these harmful effects by virtue of the
financial incentives they provide to claimants and respondents. By
comparison, the financial incentives the English rule creates are fairer
and more sensible.
This Part first describes the various financial incentives each rule
creates. Then it notes the connections between the pro-claimant rule
and the alleged “pro-investor bias,” with reference to Schill’s
argument that this bias is a positive feature of the investor-state
168
arbitration system.
Finally, this Part analyzes the connection
between application of the American rule and the regulatory chill
that critics of the system have observed, and explains why the
American rule encourages high-value, low-merit nuisance suits
against host states.
A. The Financial Incentives That Each Rule Creates
Each rule on legal costs produces a unique set of incentives for
prospective parties. The English rule encourages claimants to bring
169
stronger, smaller claims. By contrast, the American rule encourages
170
claimants to bring weaker, larger claims. The pro-claimant rule
171
encourages the bringing of all claims, no matter how small or weak.
Under the American rule, because even a successful claimant is
required to bear its own costs, the rational claimant is discouraged
from bringing a claim for an amount less than the cost of litigating,

167. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
168. Schill, supra note 6, at 657.
169. In this discussion, the strength or weakness of a claim is defined as the probability of its
success at trial. A claim may be made weak or strong by virtue of its factual or legal basis. The
size of a claim, by contrast, refers to the monetary amount sought by the claimant in damages.
See, e.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?,
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143, 156 (1987) (“[A] plaintiff with a low estimate of her chances will give
a relatively high weight to the prospect of indemnifying her opponent and will be less inclined to
sue. For analogous reasons, however, the English rule encourages plaintiffs with relatively low
ratios of total stakes to total cost and relatively high probabilities of victory.” (footnote
omitted)).
170. See, e.g., Prichard, supra note 5, at 460–61 (noting that the American cost rules allowing
group and class action litigation, expanding the scope of litigation, and providing minimal fee
shifting do not create institutional barriers to litigating novel legal theories).
171. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 5, at 445 (“The incentive to bring suit is greater under the
Pro-plaintiff rule than under either the American or British rule.”).
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even if the probability of recovering on the claim is 100 percent. On
the other hand, the rational claimant is encouraged to bring a claim if
the amount of the claim discounted by the probability of losing is
greater than the claimant’s own legal costs, even if the probability of
173
losing is very high. Therefore, a claimant under the American rule is
encouraged to bring a weak, large claim but discouraged from
bringing a strong, small claim.
By contrast, under the English rule, the rational claimant is
encouraged to bring a small claim, provided the claim is strong
enough that the claimant is satisfied with its probability of winning,
174
because a prevailing claimant will not bear its own legal costs. On
the other hand, the rational claimant is discouraged from bringing a
low-probability claim, even if the amount of the claim is very great,
because a failed claim comes with the additional burden of bearing
175
the respondent’s legal costs.
Finally, the pro-claimant rule creates a financial incentive for the
bringing of any claim, no matter how small or how weak, without any
corresponding disincentives. No matter how small the claim may be,
success on the merits will protect the claimant from losing any of its
recovered damages to legal costs. No matter how weak the claim, no
possible result will require the claimant to pay the respondent’s legal
176
costs. Unlike the English rule or the American rule, the proclaimant rule tilts the playing field plainly in favor of one party, as its
name indicates.

172. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982) (“[U]nder the
American system, the plaintiff will bring suit if and only if his expected judgment would be at
least as large as his legal costs.” (emphasis omitted)).
173. See id. at 58–59 (explaining that, assuming the claimant is risk neutral and no fee
shifting is involved, under the American rule a claimant calculates whether to bring an action
simply by discounting the probability of winning by the expected legal costs).
174. See id. at 59 (“[I]t is apparent that the frequency of suit will be greater under the British
system when the plaintiff believes the likelihood of prevailing is sufficiently high . . . . because
when the plaintiff is relatively optimistic about prevailing . . . he will be thinking about the
possibility of not having to pay any . . . costs . . . .”).
175. See id. at 59–60 (explaining that suits with a low probability of success in the British
system are, on average, more costly than in the American system because an unsuccessful
claimant is responsible for opposing legal costs).
176. See id. at 60 (noting that the only factors a claimant considers in a pro-claimant system
are the expected legal costs and the probability of success).
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B. The Pro-Claimant Rule and Proinvestor Bias
Tilting the playing field is exactly what motivates jurisdictions to
deploy the pro-claimant rule. That is, when a jurisdiction perceives a
preexisting power imbalance between certain classes of potential
claimants and respondents, the jurisdiction may adopt the pro177
claimant rule for certain types of litigation to correct this imbalance.
For example, because employers almost always have greater access to
financial resources than do their employees, numerous American
statutes allow employees to recover attorneys’ fees if they prevail in
178
suits against their employers. Likewise, the ECHR follows the proclaimant rule because the victims of human rights abuses are “often
179
indigent, social outcasts, or marginalized.”
In his 2006 article endorsing the pro-claimant rule, Schill argues
180
that the investor-state context is analogous. According to Schill, the
“equality paradigm” followed in ordinary litigation and commercial
arbitration should be discarded in disputes between states and
investors because the states and investors are in a “hierarchical
181
relationship,” rather than on equal footing. States may “unilaterally
impose binding obligations on a foreign investor in the form of
182
administrative orders or legislation.”
Further, “under general
international law, a State is even entitled . . . to change the national
183
law that governs investor-State contracts.”
But Schill is wrong to imply that the state is therefore always in a
position of power over the investor during dispute settlement.
Though Schill correctly points out that the investor-state relationship
is not like a commercial relationship, none of the sovereign powers
Schill identifies has any effect on the outcome of arbitration. It is
unclear why sovereign powers necessarily create a dispute-settlement
environment that does not fit an equality paradigm, especially when

177. Rowe, supra note 144, at 663–65.
178. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“The
court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”).
179. SHELTON, supra note 164, at 368 (“Attorneys who bring human rights cases need to be
paid because fee awards encourage them to represent victims who are often indigent, social
outcasts, or marginalized. . . . Without financial recompense, attorneys in repressive states have
little incentive to provide services for those most in need.”).
180. Schill, supra note 6, at 679.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 678.
183. Id.
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abusing sovereign powers is how states incur liability. The only
sovereign power that would be useful in this context, immunity from
suit, is already waived by accession to an investment treaty. None of
the host state’s other sovereign powers can assist it during investorstate arbitration.
Actual power imbalances during investor-state arbitration are
more likely to arise from another source of power, unrelated to
national sovereignty: financial resources. The party with greater
financial resources can hire superior legal representation, conduct
factual research in greater depth, and present its case in a more
184
effective fashion. Though in some cases the host state may have
185
greater access to financial resources than does the claimant, this is
not always the case. The vast majority of claimants are transnational
186
corporations with substantial budgets. A 2007 study found that 20
percent of investor-state arbitration was initiated by corporations that
187
ranked in Fortune’s Global 500. In fact, in seven of those cases, the
claimant’s corporate revenues exceeded the GDP of the defending
188
country.
The most notorious example of a claimant outspending and outlawyering a respondent is the case of CDC Group PLC v. Republic of
189
the Seychelles. The Republic of Seychelles, an island country of
190
approximately eighty thousand people, “many of them illiterate,”
was represented solely by its attorney general, whose office had an
unreliable Internet connection, no access to Westlaw or Lexis, and

184. See Kate M. Supnik, Note, Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to
Reconcile Competing Interests in International Investment Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 343, 366 (2009)
(observing that “developing . . . states . . . often lack sufficient resources to adequately represent
themselves in proceedings”).
185. For example, the United States is one of the more frequent respondents. See Franck,
supra note 56, at 86–87 (illustrating that only Argentina and Mexico were more frequent
respondents than was the United States, although Canada, the Czech Republic, and Egypt were
respondents in an equal number of cases as the United States). With an annual federal budget
estimated between $3 and $4 trillion, the United States is also the wealthiest frequent
respondent. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 146 tbl.S-1 (2010).
186. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 67, app. at 31–32.
187. Id. at ix.
188. Id. at 5.
189. CDC Grp. PLC v. Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award
(Dec. 17, 2003), 11 ICSID Rep. 211 (2007).
190. Wälde, supra note 50, at 559.
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only two outdated English treatises on contract law. The claimant,
the Commonwealth Development Corporation, though technically
“an investor” covered under the treaty, was not purely a private
192
party, but an instrumentality of the British government.
Represented by a major international law firm based in London with
193
a specialty practice in investor-state arbitration, the claimant routed
194
the respondent and recovered a total of $4.6 million.
Following a de facto pro-claimant rule in such lopsided contexts
only provides fuel for critics and uncooperative governments, who
195
already protest that “the rules are rigged” in favor of investors. A
system in which an arm of the British government can mobilize the
Magic Circle to retrieve millions of dollars from a tiny island republic
can hardly be characterized as structurally imbalanced in favor of the
respondent. Such a system is not at all like employment litigation in
the United States or human rights disputes before the ECHR, in
which the claimants are frequently at a financial disadvantage. Thus,
the investor-state arbitration system seems like a bad candidate for
the pro-claimant rule.
C. The American Rule and Regulatory Chill
The investor-state arbitration system is also a bad candidate for
the American rule because of its particular vulnerability to nuisance
suits. “Nuisance suits” are suits that may have little chance of success
but that would still be cheaper for respondents to settle than to
196
litigate. Economists have shown that a respondent is most likely to
settle a nuisance suit under the American rule and least likely to
197
settle a nuisance suit under the English rule. In the investor-state
context, nuisance suits could force a host state to spend part of its
budget to needlessly settle low-merit claims, rather than to promote
191. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 261–62
(2007).
192. Wälde, supra note 50, at 564.
193. Gottwald, supra note 191, at 261.
194. CDC Grp., Award, ¶ 62.
195. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 67, at 24.
196. D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3 (1985).
197. See id. at 5 (explaining that nuisance suits succeed when the defendant’s litigation costs
exceed the cost of settling but that “under the British system the willingness of the plaintiff to
litigate and to file a claim will be less than under the American system if the likelihood of
prevailing [on the merits] is low” (emphasis omitted)).

RIESENBERG IN PRINTER PROOF

1010

12/5/2010 11:12:12 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:977

198

the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. They might also force a
state’s government to refrain from legitimate uses of its police power
that could give a potential claimant an opportunity to bring a
199
nuisance suit. To limit this avenue for “legalized blackmail” of host
200
states, investor-state tribunals should apply the English rule on legal
costs, rather than the American rule.
Theoretically, the investor-state arbitration system is already
particularly vulnerable to nuisance suits, regardless of which legal cost
award rule it applies. Economists have demonstrated that
respondents are most vulnerable to nuisance suits when they are
201
uncertain as to whether a claim is credible or when the cost of
202
responding to a claim is higher than the cost of settling.
Unfortunately, uncertainty and expense are two hallmarks of
203
investor-state arbitration. Though using awards of legal costs as a
penalty for frivolous claims and bad faith is likely to lessen the threat
of nuisance suits, this will not be a sufficient deterrent in all instances.
A respondent must spend a great deal of money determining for itself
whether the claim is frivolous before it can even begin to prove as
much to the tribunal. Unlike sanctions for bad-faith litigation in some
204
domestic systems, with which judges may punish misconduct at any
time after the filing of a claim, investor-state tribunals cannot award
costs to either party except as “part of the award”—that is, after the
205
tribunal makes a final decision on all the issues of the dispute.
Effectively, unless a respondent is certain that a claim is
frivolous, it must be careful at the outset to research, analyze, and
argue all potential legal and factual issues or lose its opportunity to
address those issues during arbitration. Consequently, before the
tribunal ever has the opportunity to punish a claimant for bringing a
198. See, e.g., ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 67, at 4 (“[T]he threat of massive damages
awards can put a ‘chilling effect’ on responsible policy-making.”).
199. See, e.g., COSBEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 20 (“A secondary concern is that regulators
who are held liable for their impacts on investors will not regulate to the extent that they should
(the regulatory chill argument).”).
200. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 67, at 13.
201. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
437, 438 (1988).
202. Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 196, at 3.
203. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 484 (2009) (noting the considerable “costs and
uncertainties” of investor-state arbitration).
204. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
205. SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 89, at 1241.
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nuisance claim, the respondent must first pay counsel to guide it
through at least the following phases: constitution of the arbitral
206
panel, assessment of the arbitrators’ conflicts and disqualification
207
208
proceedings, memorials and hearings on provisional measures,
209
memorials and hearings on jurisdiction and admissibility, memorials
210
production and review of
and hearings on ancillary claims,
211
212
documents, and memorials and hearings on core issues. During
this lengthy process, the respondent spends on average between one
213
and two million dollars per year, and potentially far more.
Because investor-state arbitration is already particularly
vulnerable to nuisance suits, the American rule serves this regime
very poorly. The American rule exacerbates the threat of nuisance
suits and encourages settlement even when a claim is frivolous or, at
least, unlikely to succeed. Continued application of the American rule
only confirms the perception that investor-state arbitration is a
mechanism for the legalized blackmail of host states, impeding the
ability of governments to protect the health, safety, and human rights
214
of their citizens. To correct this, investor-state tribunals should
abandon the American rule and apply the English rule instead.
CONCLUSION
In the last several years, investor-state tribunals and
commentators have cautioned with increasing frequency that “a
balanced approach” is the best way of interpreting an investment

206. Since private parties are unlikely to have worked with international arbitrators in the
past, they often need legal counsel to help them make a good selection of arbitrators. United
Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes: 2.7 Procedural Issues, at 11–12, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232
/Add.6 (Mar. 11, 2003) (noting that parties retain freedom to choose their own arbitrators to sit
on the tribunal).
207. Id. at 15–18.
208. Id. at 27.
209. LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 85
(2004) (noting that parties must object as soon as possible to jurisdiction or lose the ability to
address the issue).
210. United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 206, at 23.
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id. at 21–22.
213. See Secretariat, United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 86, ¶ 14
(noting that “[a] cursory review of cost decisions in recent awards suggests that the average legal
costs incurred by Governments are $1 to $2 million”).
214. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 67, at 13.
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treaty’s substantive protections, and that tribunals should “temper”
215
their “pro-investor inclination.” This is because “an interpretation
which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign
investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign
investments and so undermine the overall aim” of the investor-state
216
arbitration system.
Though these cautionary statements refer
generally to the textual interpretation of investment treaties’
substantive protections, rather than to the exercise of discretion
under Article 61(2) of the Washington Convention with regard to
legal costs, these statements share a common spirit with the
arguments advanced in this Note. Professor Schill was able to argue
viably in 2006 that conferring a special advantage on claimants was
appropriate, given that the object and purpose of investment treaties
217
seemed primarily to be protection of these claimants. Today,
however, Schill’s argument seems dangerous. After all, the investorstate arbitration system will be unable to protect anyone unless it can
first ensure states’ willingness to participate in it. The growing array
of proposed quasi-legislative solutions might help to save the system,
218
but only if they can be politically implemented.
In the meantime, the best safeguard of the system is the wisdom
of the tribunals themselves. When text is silent, as text typically is
with respect to legal costs in investor-state arbitration, tribunals’
principled application of law relies on their consideration of two
215. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 115 (2009); see also Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, ¶ 307 (June 14, 2006), 14 ICSID Rep. 374 (2009)
(“[T]he [Bilateral Investment Treaty] itself is a document that requires certain treatment of
investment which the parties have considered necessary to stimulate the flow of private
capital. . . . [Therefore t]he Tribunal in interpreting the [agreement] must be mindful of the
objective the parties intended to pursue by concluding it.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Saluka Invs. BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 300 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Mar. 17 2006),
15 ICSID Rep. 274 (2010) (“The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the
Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign
investment and extending and identifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a
balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for the protection
of investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be accorded to
foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign investments and
so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ mutual economic
relations.”).
216. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 215, at 115–16.
217. Schill, supra note 6, at 695–96.
218. See Brower, supra note 78, at 348 (calling “simple, top-down solutions” unfeasible and
drawing on “eight decades of failure to negotiate comprehensive multilateral treaties on foreign
investment” as proof).
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essential factors—first doctrine, then policy. Because the English rule
on legal costs is supported by doctrine and would serve essential
policy goals, the English rule is a promising instrument for fine-tuning
the investor-state arbitration system. Doctrinally, the English rule on
legal costs is available because ex ante agreements do not forbid it,
the respondent’s domestic law almost invariably requires it, and its
near universality in domestic litigation and commercial arbitration
may give rise to a general principle of law under public international
law.
From a public policy perspective, the English rule possesses two
advantages over the alternatives. First, the pro-claimant rule is openly
and deliberately biased against states, which is bound to discourage
states’ participation in dispute settlement. Second, the American rule
creates financial incentives that promote low-merit, high-value claims,
including nuisance suits that deter host states from legitimately using
their police power. By contrast, application of the English rule on
legal costs reduces these economic and political burdens on host
states and helps to ensure their continued participation in investorstate arbitration. This, in turn, protects and promotes foreign
investment. Therefore, by applying the English rule on legal costs in
investor-state arbitration, tribunals can reach the wisest and most
reasonable results.

